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Abstract
We study the role of reputation in dealing with the soft-budget
constraint. We examine whether the reputation of a borrower can lead
to repayment in an environment where enforcement is weak. We also
introduce lenders’ reputation and examine how this impacts on the
allocation of borrowers. We ﬁnd that reputation can harden budget
constraint and improve welfare, although it can never fully eliminate
softness. We also show that lenders who acquire a reputation for being
tough can earn higher proﬁts than lenders with reputations for being
soft.
JEL: F34, G33, P34.
1 Introduction
A critical problem in the development of eﬀective ﬁnancial systems in transi-
tion economies is the elimination of the soft-budget constraint syndrome. A
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1soft budget constraint arises when borrowers know (or expect) that they will
be bailed out in the face of adverse outcomes. The soft-budget constraint
syndrome is a major problem in emerging and transition economies (see [10]
and [11] for review of alternative theories). Soft budget constraints introduce
weak incentives for restructuring and impede the process of sectoral reallo-
cation (see, e.g. [13]). Hardening budget constraints is often considered a
key reform for transition economies. The problem is to ﬁgure out how this
can be accomplished.
In this paper we examine whether reputation can be a force for mitigating
the soft-budget constraint syndrome. In most of the literature on soft budget
constraints the ﬁnancial contracting problem is treated as a one-shot game
(see [3]; [5]). In such a setting reputation plays no role. In a dynamic set-
ting borrowers and lenders must consider how their current decisions impact
on future opportunities, and this may act to limit opportunistic behavior.
This suggests that reputational mechanisms may alter the calculations that
borrowers and lenders make in one-shot games (see [7]; [14]). Borrowers
may perceive that earning a good reputation may enhance future borrow-
ing opportunities. Lenders that acquire a reputation for being tough may
deter opportunistic borrowers and hence lower the rate of future defaults.
Acquiring a reputation for being tough may thus enhance proﬁtability for
lenders. If lenders with tough reputations earn higher proﬁts then one may
expect that they will grow at the expense of lenders with soft reputations.
Thus over time, an economy may evolve towards harder budget constraints.
Reputational considerations may thus lead to the emergence of hard-budget
constraints even without any explicit or implicit government policy to that
eﬀect.
Reputation may be especially important for ﬁnancial contracting in tran-
sition economies because of weak legal enforcement. In situations where
third-party enforcement is absent self-enforcing contracts are necessary to
sustain relationships. Reputation could perhaps play such a role; for exam-
ple, a borrower may service a debt rather than risk damage to his reputation
if this will worsen future borrowing opportunities. Yet the value of reputa-
tion in dealing with the soft-budget constraint is not obvious for two reasons.
First, Bulow and Rogoﬀ [1] have shown that reputation cannot support sov-
ereign debt when borrowers can retain some of their assets.1 In such cases the
1T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h ec o s tt ot h eb o r r o w e ro fa u t a r k yi nt h ef u t u r ei sm i t i g a t e db y
the wealth saved by not servicing the debt.
2loss of reputation is insuﬃcient to support lending. Early in transition the
penalties that lenders can impose on borrowers may be so weak that it resem-
bles the case of sovereign debt, hence reputation may not be a powerful force
in this environment. Second, a key feature of transition is a lack of trans-
parency. Financial underdevelopment, weak regulation, and the inheritance
of socialist practices combine to make interpretation of ﬁnancial information
very diﬃc u l t .I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n ti tm a yb ev e r yd i ﬃcult for a party to
develop a reputation because the noise in any communication outweighs the
signal. These two features suggest that the eﬀectiveness of reputation as a
mitigating device is open to question, especially early in transition. As the
transition proceeds, enforcement improves as does transparency. Hence, the
role of reputation in ﬁnancial contracting may as well.
Although the literature on the soft-budget constraint is quite large,2 there
is only one paper we are aware of that studies the role of reputation –
Alexeev and Kim [2], which considers the role of a lender’s reputation in
mitigating the soft-budget constraint. They show that such a reputation may
be valuable if it improves the borrower pool a lender faces, and they show that
this eﬀect will be more powerful under decentralization than in a centralized
system. Their model diﬀers from ours, however, in several ways. First, we
consider both borrower’s and lender’s reputation, and how these interact.
Second, in their model tough lenders have no diﬃculty attracting borrowers.
Only experienced entrepreneurs with bad projects avoid tough lenders. In
our model even able borrowers can have bad luck. Hence, even able borrowers
with sound reputations would prefer to bank with soft lenders, as they will
be more lenient in adverse circumstances. Hence, for tough lenders to emerge
they will have to attract borrowers — they must oﬀer something in return; in
our case a lower interest rate. But this will only make sense for the lenders
if their reputations are suﬃciently credible to deter the mediocre borrowers
who would also prefer lower interest rates. We show that there are equilibria
where lenders will value having a tough reputation. Indeed, we show that
under plausible conditions lenders with tough reputations will earn higher
proﬁts that lenders with soft reputations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the
environment. Then (in section 3) we examine the role of borrower’s repu-
tation but treat lenders as identical. In section 4 we allow lenders to diﬀer
as well and examine the role of lender’s reputation. Section 5 oﬀers some
2See [10] and [11] for surveys.
3concluding thoughts.
2 Environment
We model the interaction between lenders and borrowers as an inﬁnitely re-
peated discounted game. Thus, time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite.
At every date there is a [0,1]-continuum of risk-neutral lenders and a [0,1]-
continuum of risk-neutral borrowers. Lenders and borrowers are formed in
pairs to undertake investment projects. We assume that in the beginning of
every odd-numbered period lenders and borrowers are matched together. A
project requires two periods to complete, however, any project can be liqui-
dated after one period. Once a project is either completed or liquidated, the
match between a lender and a borrowers dissolves; if a project is liquidated
(in the beginning of an even-numbered period), then the pair has to wait
until the next period to be matched with other individuals. Thus, every pair
stays together for at most two periods. We assume that the matching process
is random and uniform; every unmatched borrower has an equal chance to
meet every unmatched lender.
To study reputation we assume that agents make choices — eﬀort levels —
which eﬀect the results of the project. This introduces a hidden action (moral
hazard) element. We also have a hidden information problem. Lenders and
borrowers have asymmetric information about their types.3 Hence, there will
be an inference problem: how to distinguish poor borrower types from good
borrowers who supply low eﬀort. It is this potential pooling problem that
will make reputation potentially important.
Projects are of two types: good and bad. All projects require a unit
investment per period; we assume that in every period all lenders posses
a unit endowment which they can either consume or invest in a project.
Borrowers have no endowment, but they are the only agents that have the
technology to undertake projects. A completed good project yields a gross
return X>2; gross return to a completed bad project is stochastic. We
assume that a bad project can be either a success or failure; it yields X with
probability p (success) and x, x<2, with probability 1 − p (failure). If a
project is a success the borrower receives a share, a (0 <a<1) of the gross
3In section 3 we consider identical lenders so the hidden information concerns only
the borrowers’ types. In section 4 we introduce lenders’ types so that there is two-sided
asymmetric information.
4return. Also, we assume that p(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − p)(x − 2) > 0,w h i c h
implies that all projects are ex ante proﬁtable and, therefore, are ﬁnanced
by lenders.4
In the beginning of the ﬁrst stage (period) of a project the borrower must
exert an eﬀort level, either high (E)o rl o w( e), which impacts the quality
of the project. Eﬀort is costly. For simplicity we can let the cost of high
eﬀo r ta l s ob ei n d e x e db yE,a n dt h ec o s to fl o we ﬀort by e.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
we assume that E>e≥ 0. We assume that the borrowers are of two types
– able and mediocre; let λ be the measure of able borrowers. Given eﬀort,
able borrowers have (on average) a higher project quality than mediocre
borrowers. If an able borrower chooses high eﬀort, then the probability that
the project is good is Π; if an able borrower chooses low eﬀort, then the
probability that the project is good is π,w h e r eΠ > π. The probability that
a mediocre borrower has a good project is π regardless of her eﬀort.
We understand reputation as a record of past performance. Speciﬁcally,
we can think of this as a report provided by the lender after a project match is
completed. For concreteness, we assume that every lender writes a reference
letter for the borrower where the outcome of the project is reported. Lenders
always observe outcomes of completed projects; we assume that if a lender
liquidates an incomplete project, the lender learns how the project would
have fared had it been completed.5 In other words, a lender can always
accurately assess the outcome of a borrowers project, so the reputation of
the latter is uncontaminated by the lender’s own actions.
All the letters that pertain to the borrower’s history are presented to a
new lender immediately after the match takes place. Lenders place more
weight on recent performance and discount previous letters; for simplicity,
we assume that only the most recent letter matters.6 Reputations are not,
4Our main focus here is the soft-budget constraint, that is a decision to reﬁnance a
project. Therefore, we do not concentrate on the initial decision to ﬁnance; the role of
reputation in making such decisions has been studied, most notably by Diamond (1989).
5The idea is that when a project is liquidated the lender inspects the assets and can
determine whether it would have worked or not. This means that the lender’s report is
going to be independent of the action that he undertakes (i.e., liquidation or not). This
assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
6When lenders are homogeneous nothing signiﬁcant would change if memories were
longer, except that the algebra would be much more complicated. When lenders are
heterogeneous then this assumption is less innocuous. With longer memories lenders may
engage in strategic liquidation in order to disguise their types. We discuss this below in
section 4.
5however, perfect signals of past performance. When an economy is not fully
transparent ﬁnancial histories are not perfect signals of past behavior. To
model the noise introduced by a lack of transparency, we introduce some
probability, denoted φ, that the letter has been tampered with by the bor-
rower, who can do so at zero resource cost. Because the letters are the only
intertemporal link in this economy, the value of φ is crucial for the importance
of reputation. For example, when is φ close to one (low transparency) then
almost every borrower with a bad letter will manage to replace it with a good
one. Thus, there will be a lot of average borrowers with bad projects, but
with good letters. In that case, letters are ineﬀective as a signalling device
(of the type of borrowers) which implies that reputation is not important.
When φ → 0 transparency is high and reputation is more important.
After the ﬁrst stage of a project is completed, the lender learns some
extra information about the project. This extra information concerns the
state of the economy or the industry — it is an aggregate, as opposed to, a
project-speciﬁc signal. Thus, we assume that the lender receives a signal,
which is correlated with the outcome of the project. The signal takes two
values – with probability p the signal is high (σ) and with probability 1−p
t h es i g n a li sl o w( σ). If the project is bad, then the outcome of the project
is perfectly correlated with the the signal – an observed high signal implies
that the project will be a success; an observed low signal implies that the
project will be a failure. Because a good project is always a success, the
return on a good project is independent of the signal. We should emphasize
that the lender remains uninformed about the type of the project. If the
signal is high, then the lender has nothing to worry about; the project will
be a success regardless of type. If the signal is low, then the lender has to
really think about what to do with the project – either to reﬁnance or to
liquidate – because the project will be a success if it is good and a failure
if it is bad. The likelihood of each of the two outcomes (conditional on
the observation of the low signal) depends on the borrower’s reputation;i n
particular, a good reputation increases the chance that the project is actually
good. Thus, even though reputation is irrelevant here for the initial decision
to ﬁnance a project, it is important for the decision to reﬁnance; some of the
bad projects may be denied ﬁnancing in the second stage and the budget
constraint will, then, be hardened.
We think of this signal as an economy-wide or industry-wide piece of in-
6formation.7 This information thus contributes to the evaluation of the like-
lihood that a project will turn out successful to the extent that the project’s
outcome depends on the general economy. Many projects that have a high
potential for success may face problems if there is a negative aggregate shock.
The interesting point is that although this shock says nothing about the in-
dividual project, the reputation of the borrower may be important for how
a lender responds to this signal.
Thus, conditional on reputation and on the observed signal, the lender
decides whether to liquidate the project or to invest another unit in order
to complete it. The liquidation value of a project is L<1.T h e v a l u e
of L is another parameter crucial for the importance of reputation; if L
is low (that is if liquidation costs are high), then no project will ever be
l i q u i d a t e de v e ni f( a f t e rt h eﬁrst stage) it becomes evident to the lender that
the project will incur losses. In this case no information the lender has about
the borrower (including reputation) is relevant for lender’s decision; the soft-
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n te m e r g e sb e c a u s er e ﬁnancing is better than liquidation (see
[5] for a similar assumption).
The gains from a project are divided between the lender and the borrower
in accordance with a binding ﬁnancial contract.8 We assume that in the case
of project liquidation or failure lenders can seize all of the residual value of
the project.9 In case of success, borrowers receive a constant share, denoted
7One way to think about this is with an agricultural parallel. Consider the projects as
crop ﬁelds. The lender does not know whether the borrower did a good job planting and
fertilizing the crop, but she observes the weather from her oﬃce window. If the weather is
bad (low signal), the lender concludes that the harvest may be not so great – bad weather
increases the likelihood that the harvest will be poor. At this point the lender may want
to recall what she has on ﬁle about the borrower; if the borrower has a proven record of
having good harvests, then the lender might decide that the borrower is good at raising
the crop and, even though the weather is bad, the harvest will suﬃce to pay back another
loan. If the record is poor, then the lender might decide that the borrower is indeed a bad
farmer and, given bad weather, the chance of good harvest (and, hence, repayment) is too
small to provide another loan.
8It may seem strange that we assume binding contracts with regard to distribution given
that we argued that weak contract enforcement is an important feature of transition. The
assumption that repayment to the lender is given is standard in this literature. Still it
would be interesting to see how reputation would aﬀect the repayment decision, but that
is outside the scope of this paper.
9Of course this may be very low if liquidation costs are high. The key point of this
assumption is that the borrower retains none of the residual value in the case of failure.
If liquidation costs are suﬃcienly high the same is true for the lender.
7a (0 <a<1) of a project’s net return.10 These assumptions are suﬃcient
to guarantee that no borrower will ever pretend that the project is a failure
when it is actually a success; the converse is not possible here because in that
case borrowers have insuﬃcient resources to pay back the loan. Notice that
even though we eliminate strategic cheating, reputation is still a strategic
choice on the part of borrowers (which is consistent with standard models of
reputation) because it directly depends on their choice of eﬀort. Given our
assumptions, high eﬀort results in a higher probability of project’s success
and, thus, in a good reputation.
As we have already noted, liquidation costs and transparency are crucial
for the value of reputation. We assume that in the early stages of transition
liquidation costs are high and transparency is low. In such an environment
all debt is similar to sovereign debt – it is prohibitively costly to collect and
a failed project with one lender has no consequence for borrowing with other
lenders. Bulow and Rogoﬀ [1] show that if direct sanctions are not feasible
and the debtor can keep its foreign assets, then a reputation for repayment
cannot support sovereign lending. Their argument applies here as well;11
thus, a borrower’s reputation has no importance in early transition. As the
transition proceeds, however, liquidation costs decrease and transparency
increases; in that situation lenders can recover more of their loans, and a
default to any one lender reduces opportunities with other lenders. Thus,
reputation acquires value as the transition proceeds.
3 Borrower’s reputation
We limit ourselves to the description of stationary equilibria. Given our
speciﬁed environment, the only equilibria in which reputation is important
are those, where able borrowers choose high eﬀort.12 As we already noted,
in any such equilibrium a borrower’s reputation signals her type. Therefore,
a good reputation indicates a higher probability of borrower’s being able; a
bad reputation raises the chance of borrower being mediocre. For an able
10The assumption a is ﬁxed is standard in the literature on soft-budget constraints. One
could relax this assumption by allowing free enty of lenders, and make borrowing costs
endogenous. None of our results depend on the assumption of ﬁxed a, however.
11The role of the cash-in-advance consumption-insurance contracts in the Bulow-Rogoﬀ
model is performed by loans from uninformed lenders.
12Because the probability of a project’s being good is unaﬀected by a mediocre bor-
rower’s eﬀort, mediocre borrowers will always choose low eﬀort.
8borrower the probability that she receives a good letter from the lender is
PS|A = Π + p(1 − Π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − Π). (1)
Notice that we take into account the fact that a fraction φ of unsuccessful
borrowers tamper with their letters. For a mediocre borrower the probability
of a good letter is
PS|M = π + p(1 − π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − π). (2)
Given (1) and (2), the measure of borrowers of type i, i ∈ {A,M}, who have
reputation j, j ∈ {S,F},d e n o t e dMij is:
MAS = λ(Π + p(1 − Π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − Π))
MAF = λ(1 − φ)(1 − p)(1 − Π)
MMS =( 1− λ)(π + p(1 − π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − π))
MMF =( 1− λ)(1− φ)(1 − p)(1 − π).
(3)
Straightforward application of Bayes’ rule yields the probability that given a
good letter, the borrower is able, µA|S, as the ratio of the measure MAS of
able borrowers with good letters to the measure MS ≡ MAS + MMS of all





The measure of borrowers with bad letters, MF ≡ MAF + MMF,i s :
MF =( 1− φ)(1− p)[λ(1 − Π)+( 1− λ)(1− π)]. (4)
Notice that if φ =1 ,t h e nMF is zero which implies that every borrower
comes to a lender with a good letter. In this case µA|S = λ,t h eo b j e c t i v e
prior probability that a borrower is able. Thus, if the economy is fully opaque,
reputation carries no information about the borrower and, for that reason,
has no value.
Given an observed low signal, the lender knows that a project is a success
if and only if it is good, and that a project is a failure if and only if it is bad.
The probability that a project will be good conditional on a bad letter is,
ζG|F = ΠµA|F + πµM|F, (5)
9and the probability that this same project is bad is,
ζB|F =( 1− Π)µA|F +( 1− π)µM|F. (6)
Likewise, given a good letter, the probability that the project is good is,
ζG|S = ΠµA|S + πµM|S, (7)
and the probability that it is bad is,
ζB|S =( 1− Π)µA|S +( 1− π)µM|S. (8)
Initially, as the project is started, the lender’s state is deﬁned solely by
the borrower’s reputation. This follows because all projects are ex ante prof-
itable, and lenders provide initial ﬁnancing to all projects regardless of their
reputation. After the ﬁrst stage, however, lenders acquire additional infor-
mation about the project; the state becomes a pair – reputation (either F
or S) and the observed signal (either σ or σ). Given the state, the value for






where V is the value function, V ≡ (VFσ,V Sσ,V Fσ,V Sσ), T is the transition
matrix among states, q is the vector of (expected) project returns, and β,
β ∈ (0,1), is a period discount factor. Because matching is exogenous, the
process which governs transition among states is i.i.d.M o r e o v e r ,t h es i g n a l
next-period is independent of today’s state and of the matching process.
Then, if the observed signal is σ, then the lender knows that the project is
a success regardless of its type, and hence, reputation. Because continuation
value of a lender is independent of her actions and liquidation of a project
always incurs a loss, lenders never liquidate such projects, which implies that
VFσ = VSσ. This allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the state space
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ζG|S(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2),L − 1
¤
(1 − a)(X − 2)

.
10Because the transition probabilities are independent of the lender’s ac-
tions, conditional on an observed low signal, the lender liquidates a project
of a low reputation borrower and reﬁnances the project of a high reputation
borrower if and only if
ζG|F(1−a)(X−2)+ζB|F(x−2) ≤ L−1 ≤ ζG|S(1−a)(X−2)+ζB|S(x−2). (11)
It is evident from (11) that higher liquidation costs makes reﬁnance of high
reputation borrowers (with low signals) more likely.
Before we proceed to the borrower’s problem, we impose restrictions that
guarantee the unconditional presence of both soft and hard budget con-
straints. Assume that the lender observes a low signal. Conditional on that
observation, we want the lender be willing to liquidate any project regard-
less of the borrower’s type at least when liquidation costs are low enough.
Likewise, we want the lender be willing to continue with any project if the
liquidation costs are high. This can be guaranteed if the following holds.13
Assumption 1. Suﬃcient condition for the hard-budget constraint
Π(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − Π)(x − 2) < 0.
Assumption 2. Suﬃcient condition for the soft-budget constraint
−1 < π(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − π)(x − 2).
An equilibrium where reputation has value exists only if all able borrowers
choose to work hard. The state of an able borrower once the project is chosen
is her type, able (A) or mediocre (M) and her reputation, either good (S) or
bad (F). Given the state s ≡ (i,j),l e tdAj, j ∈ {F,S}, be an able borrower’s
strategy – the probability that the borrower chooses high eﬀort. In terms
of this notation, when all able borrowers work hard dAF = dAS =1 . Because
lenders never liquidate apparently successful projects, fFσ = fSσ =1 . Let
fjσ be the lender’s strategy – the probability that given her state, which is
13Notice that Assumption 1 and the suﬃcient condition for initial ﬁnancing,
p(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − p)(x − 2) > 0,
imply that Π <p , i.e. the probability that the project is good must be less than the
probability of success of a bad project.
11the borrower’s reputation and the observed signal, the lender reﬁnances the
project. Then, the end-of-even-period value function of an able borrower,








where, given the probability that a high eﬀort borrower’s letter is good,
PS|E = Π + p(1 − Π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − Π), (12)
and the probability that a low eﬀort borrower’s letter is bad,
PS|e = π + p(1 − π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − π), (13)











(pfFσ +( 1− p)fFσ)[Π − E]
(pfSσ +( 1− p)fSσ)[Π − E]
¸
.
Thus, the choice of able borrowers to work hard is optimal if
pΠa(X−2)−E+PF|EvF +PS|EvS ≥ pπa(X−2)−e+PF|evF +PS|evS. (14)
Expression (14) provides a suﬃcient condition which ensures that borrowers
with a bad reputation want to exert high eﬀort. Because the projects of
borrowers with a good reputation have fewer chances to be liquidated they
are also willing to work hard provided that (14) is satisﬁed. This condition




2Π(1 − φ)(1 − p)
2¢
a(X − 2) ≥ E − e.
It is evident that this condition is more likely to be satisﬁed when the beneﬁts
from high eﬀort increase (Π − π and X larger) and when the costs of high
eﬀort (E − e) are lower.
We are now ready to give the main result of this section.
12Proposition 1. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that return






a(X − 2) >E− e. (15)
Then there exists a φ ≤ 1 such that for all φ ≤ φ there exist two values, L
and L(φ), 0 <L< L(φ) < 1,s u c ht h a t
• i) if L<L , then all able borrowers work hard and no project is ever
liquidated,
• ii) if L ≤ L ≤ L(φ), then all able borrowers work hard and provided
that lenders receive a low signal, all projects of borrowers with a bad
reputation are liquidated whereas all projects of borrowers with a good
reputation are reﬁnanced,
• iii) if L>L(φ), then provided that lenders receive low signal, all
projects are liquidated.
Proposition 1 yields conditions which ensure that reputation matters.
Roughly, these conditions imply that reputation is important if the return
to eﬀort is high enough, transparency is high and liquidation costs are in the
middle range. This latter condition is hardly surprising. When liquidation
costs are very low, lenders will disregard reputation entirely and liquidate
any project when they receive a low signal. In that parameter range the
economy operates on a very hard-budget constraint; a positive fraction of
good projects gets liquidated because of the imperfect correlation between
the outcome of a project and the signal about that outcome received by
lenders. If liquidation costs are too high then the soft-budget constraint
emerges; lenders are reluctant to liquidate even if a bad reputation suggests
a higher chance that a project is a failure. It is when liquidation costs are
in the middle range that reputation matters. In that case a bad reputation
induces enough scepticism and the lenders will liquidate, whereas a good
reputation creates enough optimism for the lenders to continue ﬁnancing the
project. In this situation the budget constraint can be considered somewhat
soft, although a positive measure of good projects is still liquidated.
Notice that when reputation matters here it is because the signal about
what is taking place in the economy (or industry) causes the lender to infer a
13diﬀerence in the likely outcomes for borrowers. This aggregate (or industry)
signal is the only new piece of information that the lender obtains. Although
this signal provides no information about individual projects, it does alter the
likelihood of success conditional on reputation. Lenders know that borrowers
with good reputations can succeed in bad times, while borrowers with poor
reputations will not. Hence, reputation can matter.
Although reputation can be important, there are cases in which it has no
value. The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions for irrelevance of
reputation.
Proposition 2. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that the
return on high eﬀort is low,
(Π − π)a(X − 2) <E− e. (16)
Then no borrower works hard, and there exists a value b L such that
• i) if L<b L, then no project is ever liquidated, and
• ii) L ≥ b L, then provided that lenders receive low signal, all projects are
liquidated.
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds by showing that if the return on
eﬀort is low, then the prospect of obtaining a good reputation cannot induce
borrowers to exert high eﬀort. In this case there is no performance diﬀerence
between able and mediocre borrowers. Consequently, the reference letter
carries no information about borrower’s type and, as result, cannot be of
any use. Depending on liquidation costs, the economy operates under either
hard- or soft-budget constraint – the outcome familiar from the static game
(see Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) for similar result).
The last issue we deal with in this section concerns the welfare eﬀects
of reputation. In our setting zero transparency is equivalent to borrowers
having no reputation. Hence, given the results in Propositions 1 and 2,
one might expect that a suﬃcient increase in transparency would be welfare
improving simply because it boosts up the performance of borrowers. This is
not, however, the complete story. Suﬃcient transparency may allow lenders
to treat borrowers diﬀerently depending on their past. Hence, we examine
here the welfare implications of higher transparency conditional on eﬀort
14exerted by borrowers. What we ﬁnd is that higher transparency is always
good for lenders because it allows them to make more informed decisions.
However, higher transparency may be detrimental to borrowers because it
reduces the opportunities to pool, and hence be treated in the same way. As
a result, social welfare may decrease if reputation is introduced.
Our welfare criterion is the ex ante utility of both borrowers and lenders,










For a given φ the following proposition shows how social welfare W(L;φ)
changes with the residual liquidation value L provided that the return on
high eﬀort exceeds its cost even if the economy is fully opaque.
Proposition 3. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that return
on high eﬀort exceeds its cost,
(Π − π)pa(X − 2) >E− e.
Then, for all φ ∈ [0,1) there exists L∗, L <L ∗ < L(φ), where L and
L(φ) are deﬁned in Proposition 1, such that:
W(L;φ) <W (L;1)for all L ∈ (L,L
∗)
W(L;φ) >W (L;1)for all L ∈ (L
∗,L(φ))
W(L;φ)=W(L;1)otherwise.
The interval L ∈ (L,L(φ)) is the one where, according to Proposition 1,
reputation matters. The point of Proposition 3 is that there is a threshold
level of liquidation value, L∗, such that if liquidation values are lower than this
threshold, reputation decreases welfare; if liquidation costs are higher than
L∗, then reputation is welfare increasing. The threshold L∗ is independent
of φ; what does change with transparency is the magnitude of the eﬀect: the
absolute value of the welfare diﬀerence, WL ≡ |W(L;φ) − W(L;1)|,w h i c hi s
a non-increasing function of φ.
What is going on here? If liquidation costs are too high (L below the
threshold) then the gain to the lenders from greater transparency is small
since they will not act on it. So there is no gain to the lenders but clearly
some borrowers lose. If L is above the threshold, on the other hand, lenders
15will beneﬁt from greater transparency. So the fact that (some) the borrowers
lose is oﬀset in this case.
An implication of Proposition 1 is that depending on liquidation costs
reputation can either harden or soften the budget constraint. In the latter
case reputation is always welfare increasing; in the former case welfare can
go both ways. Given our normalization of payoﬀs, softening of the budget
constraint increases the likelihood that borrowers will gain if the project turns
out to be a success, which accounts for the welfare increase.14 However, a
change in borrowers’ payoﬀs consistent with extra costs in the case of project
failure could reverse the outcome, making it consistent with the conventional
wisdom that softness is a bad thing.15
4 Adding the Lenders’ Reputation
T h u sf a rw eh a v ef o c u s e do nt h ep r o b l e mo ft h eb o r r o w e r sr e p u t a t i o na l o n e .
In this section we introduce heterogeneity among lenders and allow lenders
to develop a reputation. In particular, we consider two types of lenders,
tough and soft. Tough lenders have lower liquidation costs than soft lenders;
for that reason the former are less likely to re-ﬁnance than the latter. Be-
cause they re-ﬁnance less often than soft lenders, tough lenders can commit
to lower interest rates as well, which helps them to attract good borrow-
ers.16 Borrowers with bad reputations will be less willing to deal with tough
lenders, but even borrowers with good reputations would prefer a soft lender
if they charged identical interest rates. By deterring such borrowers the
tough lenders avoid the cost of reﬁnancing bad borrowers. A better pool of
borrowers allows tough lenders to proﬁt from charging lower interest rates.
14Recall that all projects are ex ante proﬁtable, and our welfare criteria is ex ante utility
o fb o r r o w e r sa n dl e n d e r sa c r o s ss t a t e s .
15It should be noted that the typical argument against softness of budget constraints is
that it is ineﬃcient and leads to a misallocation of resources. Savings devoted to reﬁnancing
projects could be allocated to better opportunties, enhancing growth propects. That eﬀect
is not modelled here.
16In Alexeev and Kim there are two types of borrowers (entrepreneurs), experienced and
inexperienced. The former know the type of project they have drawn, and if the project
is good they know they will be not need further ﬁnance. Hence, they know that there is
no beneﬁt to them of seeking a soft lender. In our model, on the other hand, even good
borrowers may beneﬁt from a soft lender, so tough lenders need to diﬀerentiate themselves
by oﬀering better terms.
16Hence, a lender may value the reputation of being a tough to attract a good
pool of borrowers. In this section we examine this intuition.
In our notation, a lower interest rate means a higher value of a –t h e
fraction of a project’s return retained by the borrower. We assume that there
are two values of a, which lenders can oﬀer to borrowers, aT and aS,w h e r e
aT >a S. In the beginning of every odd-numbered period lenders post a value
of a they promise to charge; upon matching with a borrower tough lenders
can stand on their promise whereas soft lenders cannot do so and behave
opportunistically. Let κ, 0 < κ < 1 be the measure of tough lenders.
We assume that borrowers cannot observe the interest rates charged by
lenders (to other borrowers) in the past; these remain private information at
all times. All that borrowers can observe prior to matching with lenders is
their promise of an interest rate and their reputation. To simplify matters
we assume that both borrowers and lenders discount past information, so
that only the most recent observation matters.17 Thus, a lender’s reputation
takes two values, denoted U and R,w h e r eU means that lender has discontin-
ued (liquidated) her most recent project and R means that the most recent
project was reﬁnanced. Also, we assume that lenders fully discount the fu-
ture. If lenders are patient, then their reputation plays two distinct roles.
First, the lenders reputation is a signal of their type; it provides information
w h i c hb o r r o w e r sc a nt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tw h e nc h o o s i n gw h ot om a t c hi na
period. Second, this reputation improves the lender’s future clientele and,
hence, to increase future payoﬀs. For this reason tough lenders who are stuck
with a soft reputation may choose to liquidate apparently successful projects
just to gain a tougher reputation. We do not consider strategic liquidation
behavior in this paper; here we analyze the role of a lender’s reputation as a
signal of their type only. As before, let β ∈ [0,1) be the discount factor of
borrowers.
When only borrowers have reputations (as in the model of section 3) all
lenders are identical; hence, borrowers are indiﬀerent concerning whom they
meet. In that case the assumption of exogenous matching seemed appropri-
ate. Because both borrowers and lenders are now heterogeneous, they may
want to target speciﬁc groups for matching among themselves. Indeed, rep-
utation matters for the lender precisely because she wishes to deter certain
types of borrowers. Hence it is important to endogenize the matching process
in this case. To endogenize matching we alter the sequence of actions of the
17This simpliﬁes the analysis but we can extend the model to longer memory.
17game and allow for a non-uniform matching process.
The timing of events is the following. In the beginning of every odd-
numbered period lenders post an interest rate they promise to charge; after
that, but before any matching takes place, the borrowers make a decision
about the population of lenders they want to be matched with; then matching
takes place and matched individuals play the above two-period project game.
Because from the borrower’s perspective the only diﬀerence between lenders
is their posted interest rate and their reputation, the borrower is indiﬀerent
with regard to lenders with the same interest-reputation pair. We assume
that if a borrower targets one particular group of lenders of positive measure,
then she gets to meet a lender from that group with probability one; if a
borrower is indiﬀerent among several groups, then she has an equal chance
to meet a lender from each group.
If search for the borrower is costless it is optimal to all lenders to post a
low interest rate in order to attract borrowers.18 In fact, because reputation
is only an imperfect indication of lender’s type, given a posted low interest
rate, a borrower will be charged a low interest only if a lender turns out to
be tough (in which case a lender honors her promise); given a posted high
interest rate, a borrower ends up paying the high interest with probability
one because, conditional on having located a borrower, all lenders prefer to
charge high interest (tough lenders do not violate their promise in that case;
other borrowers never observe a break of a promise by soft lenders, which
excludes the possibility of future punishment). This means that regardless
of reputation, every borrower is willing to target those who promise a low
interest rate and, conditional on that strategic choice of borrowers, all lenders
make such a promise. In these circumstances the matching decision of a
borrower is based entirely on reputation of a lender.
Furthermore, to avoid bottlenecks resulting from matching of populations
of unequal sizes, we let lenders form coalitions, where members of each coali-
tion pool outside resources to ﬁnance more (less) than one project per mem-
ber. Given that we have a [0,1]-continuum of lenders, we deﬁne coalitions as
ﬁn i t e( c o u n t a b l e )s u b s e t so ft h eu n i ti n t e r v a l .W er e q u i r et h a tc o a l i t i o n sa r e
uniform: all lenders in a coalition have the same type and reputation. As
regards the matching process, we assume that at all times every coalition is
matched with a homogeneous pool of borrowers, i.e. all borrowers who are
18This follows because there is no way for borrowers to force soft lenders to honor their
announcements.
18m a t c h e dw i t hag i v e nc o a l i t i o nh a v et h es a m es t a t e . E v e r yb o r r o w e rh a sa
uniform chance to be matched with every coalition within her targeted group
of lenders; given the matching strategy of borrowers, every coalition has a
uniform chance to be matched with a pool of borrowers in any given state.
We consider equilibria in which the members of each coalition receives
a uniform signal σ and is equally successful in tampering with reputation.
That is, each lender in the coalition receives the same signal. Signals might
diﬀer across coalitions, however. This formulation is consistent with our
interpretation of the signal as an industry speciﬁc shock; one can think of
the coalitions of lenders as being industrial banks. The latter also adds to the
intuition behind uniformity of tampering – a soft bank can either pretend
that it is tough or fail to do so.
Given these assumptions one can think of the matching process as fol-
lows. In every period nature partitions both borrowers and lenders into a
large number (continuum) of groups which, given the borrower’s strategy, are
uniformly matched among themselves and upon being matched act as single
individuals. The partition of lenders is permanent (banks); the partition of
borrowers is stochastic. A potentially restrictive side of this construction is
t h a tb a n k sa l w a y sh a v eah o m o g e n e o u sc l i e n t e l e ,h o w e v e rw ea r ec o n ﬁdent
that we do not miss anything signiﬁc a n th e r ew h i l ew ea v o i dt h ed i ﬃculty of
dealing with transition of bank’s reputation in case a bank liquidates some
o ft h ep r o j e c t sa n dr e ﬁnances some others.
Homogeneity implies that a state of a matched coalition is a vector
z ≡ (k,n,j,σ),w h e r ek is the type of lenders in the coalition, n is their
reputation, j is reputation of borrowers who the coalition is matched with,
and σ is the observed signal. Let fknjσ be the strategy of the coalition – the
probability that given its state z the coalition reﬁnances its clients. Likewise,
the state of a matched borrower is a triplet x ≡ (i,j,n),w h e r ei is the type
of the borrower, j is her reputation, and n is reputation of the coalition that
borrower is matched with. Given the state, a borrower chooses her eﬀort; let
dijn be the probability that a borrower chooses high eﬀort. Here we limit our-
selves to pure strategy equilibria, the ones in which lenders do not randomize
over liquidation decisions and borrowers do not randomize over the choice
of eﬀort, i.e. fknjσ ∈ {0,1} for all states z,a n ddijn ∈ {0,1} for all states
x. Then, an unmatched borrower’s matching strategy can be described by a
(multivalued) map τ, which maps an unmatched borrower’s state s =( i,j)
into the lender’s reputation n, τ : {A,M}×{S,F} → {U,R}.G i v e nap r o ﬁle
f of lender’s reﬁn a n c i n gs t r a t e g i e sa sw e l la sap r o ﬁle d of borrower’s eﬀort
19choice strategies and provided that all other players follow τ, d,a n df,a
matching strategy τ is the best response of a borrower. Our normalization
of payoﬀs implies that borrowers are always willing to target some lenders,
so that τ(s) is non-empty for all s.
A reputation for being tough is only meaningful if such lenders have
ah i g h e rp r o p e n s i t yt ol i q u i d a t e . G i v e nτ, tough lenders have a higher
propensity to liquidate if the proﬁle of their equilibrium strategies satisﬁes
fTnjσ ≤ fSnjσ for all n, j, and σ, and the inequality is strict for some pair of
states z1 ≡ (T,n,j,σ) and z2 ≡ (S,n,j,σ) such that n ∈ τ(i,j) for some i.
If tough lenders have a higher propensity to liquidate then a tough reputa-
tion means a higher chance that a coalition with such a reputation is indeed
tough, and a soft reputation means that a coalition which has soft reputation
is indeed soft.
We say that the lenders’ reputation is essential if the range of τ is the set
of lenders’ reputations {U,R},a n dg i v e nτ,o n ec a nﬁnd two states s1 and
s2, s1 6= s2, such that τ(s1) 6= τ(s2). If the lenders’ reputation is essential it
means that at least in some of the meetings between borrowers and lenders,
the preference of the former was not to randomize among the latter; we show
that, generically, this is the case provided that tough lenders have a higher
propensity to liquidate. However, if both types have equal propensity to
liquidate, then targeting lenders with particular reputation does not increase
return of the borrowers. This means that borrowers are indiﬀerent, so that
they randomize (which is the case we have already considered in section 3).
What about the borrower’s reputation? The borrower’s reputation is
essential if there is a triplet k, n, σ such that the lender liquidates in state
z1 =( k,n,j1,σ) and reﬁnances in state z2 =( k,n,j2,σ),w h e r ej1 and j2
are the two distinct values of borrower’s reputation. Here the meaning of
essentiality is that borrower’s reputation is binding for the lender’s decision.
4.1 Search and borrowers reputation
Even though the state space here is the smallest possible, the number of
equilibria where reputation is essential is large. Our strategy is to present
some of the most interesting equilibria. We start by arguing that many
equilibria one might think of are non-generic and for that reason are not
interesting. Our next proposition, for example, shows that, provided that
the lender’s reputation is informative of her type, borrowers will use search
strategies which are independent of their types except for a set of measure
20zero in parameter space.
Proposition 4. Except for a set of measure zero in the parameter space
there are no equilibria in which tough lenders have a higher propensity to
liquidate and borrowers use matching strategy which reveals their types.
The message of this proposition is that when they choose with whom to
match, borrowers target lenders according to their own reputation. Because
the types of borrowers as well as their matching histories are unobservable
by lenders, conditional on reputation, both types of borrowers can secure the
same interest rate, which implies that borrowers can separate according to
their types only if they are indiﬀerent between the two groups of lenders, i.e.
if the expected interest rate paid by tough lenders and by soft lenders is the
same. However, as stated in Proposition 4 such an equality of interest rates
is non-generic.
Because reputation alone determines the matching decision of borrowers,
essentiality of borrowers’ reputation is necessary for essentiality of lenders’
reputation. We formalize that claim as the following corollary to Proposition
4:
Corollary. Except for a set of measure zero in the parameter space there
a r en oe q u i l i b r i ai nw h i c ht o u g hl e n d e r sh a v eah i g h e rp r o p e n s i t yt ol i q u i d a t e ,
lenders’ reputation is essential, and borrowers’ reputation is not essential.
Notice that this result is rather diﬀerent from Alexeev and Kim ([2]).
They study the reputation of lenders in the absence of a value of this repu-
tation for the borrowers. This is feasible in their model because they assume
that there is an exogenous fraction of borrowers who are oblivious of lenders’
reputations. These borrowers thus randomize among all lenders. Hence,
tough lenders have no problems attracting customers. But this will not work
if borrowers care about a lenders’s reputations, as well they might if they
know that their projects may not succeed. The corollary to Proposition 4
implies that once a lenders’ reputation is available to all borrowers, it cannot
have any value in isolation from the reputation of the latter.
4.2 An example
We now present an example of an equilibrium where reputation matters for
both borrowers and lenders. In such an equilibrium there is a separation
21based on reputations – borrowers with good reputations meet lenders with
tough reputations and borrowers with bad reputations meet lenders with
soft ones. We show that such a separation beneﬁts borrowers. This follows
because the lender’s reputation gives a borrower with a good reputation a
better chance to meet a tough lender and beneﬁt from a lower interest rate.
It also helps borrowers with bad reputations to meet soft lenders and avoid
being liquidated. The eﬀect on lenders, however, is less clear cut because of
scale eﬀects. Separation by reputations may leave some lenders with fewer
clients. Even though separation implies fewer liquidations by tough lenders,
the latter may end up worse oﬀ from their tough reputation if transparency
is high and bad times are frequent because in that case there is a relatively
large number of borrowers with bad letters who choose to bank with soft
lenders. If, on the other hand, bad times are suﬃciently infrequent (we
specify how infrequent below) then tough lenders are better oﬀ for having
such a reputation.
We summarize these arguments in the following two propositions. Propo-
sition 5 provides suﬃcient conditions that guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium where there is separation by reputations. Proposition 6 then
shows that there are conditions such that lenders gain in terms of welfare
(proﬁts) from having a tough reputation.
Proposition 5. Assume that Assumption 1 holds with respect to a = aT,
Π(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − Π)(x − 2) < 0,
Assumption 2 holds with respect to a = aS,
−1 < π(1 − aS)(X − 2) + (1 − π)(x − 2),
paT <a S,
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(X − 2) ≥ E−e,
(17)
22and liquidation values LS and LT satisfy:
LS <L S,
LT <L T < LT
where LS, LT, and LT are constructed in proof. Then:
• i) borrowers with good reputation meet lenders with tough reputation;
borrowers with bad reputation meet lenders with soft reputation,
• ii) all able borrowers work hard,
• iii) soft lenders reﬁnance all projects and, conditional on observed low
signal, tough lenders liquidate all projects of borrowers with bad repu-
tation.
Proposition 6. Assume that hypotheses of Proposition 5 hold except that
condition (17) on able borrowers eﬀort is replaced by:
(Π − π)
£
κpaT +( 1− κ)aS + β
2 (1 − φ)(1− p)
2 κaTΠ
¤
(X − 2) ≥ E − e.
(18)
Then, the welfare of borrowers of both types increases when lenders have
reputations. Moreover, if the parameters satisfy:




then the existence of lenders’ reputations increases the proﬁts of tough lenders
and decreases the proﬁts of soft lenders.
Proposition 6 shows that tough lenders will generate higher proﬁts than
soft lenders if the measure of borrowers with a bad reputation is less than one-
half. Thus when reputation matters it is valuable to have a tough reputation.
But this depends on there being a suﬃcient fraction of good borrowers in the
economy. If most borrowers are bad then having a tough reputation merely
deﬂects borrowers to the soft lenders. When bad borrowers are less common
Proposition 6 shows that it is advantageous to be a tough lender. One can
observe from (19) that the fraction of borrowers with a bad reputation is
small if the aggregate state of the economy is good and there is suﬃcient
23transparency. This condition is much more likely to be satisﬁed in the later
stages of transition. Early in transition the lack of transparency and the state
of the economy make it unlikely that tough lenders will emerge. Over time,
as transparency increases and as the overall state of the economy improves
tough lenders will emerge. This suggests that reputation could be a force
that encourages lenders to be tough but that it is not an automatic process.
It also suggests that over time a virtuous circle may appear. The measure of
soft lenders shrinks and the quality of loans improves which further enhances
the growth process, and further improves transparency.
Thus, if the economy is already in good shape, then the introduction of
a lender’s reputation seems to be helpful: it helps tough lenders survive and
drives soft lenders out of business.
5C o n c l u s i o n
O u rg o a li nt h i sp a pe rw a st oc o n s i d e rh o wreputational considerations impact
on the development of hard-budget constraints. When only borrowers have
reputations (that is when lenders are identical) the eﬀect of reputation on
the soft-budget constraint is ambiguous. If liquidation costs are low then
introducing reputation may harden budget constraints. If liquidation costs
are suﬃciently high, however, the opposite occurs.
The analysis becomes more interesting when we introduce a lender’s rep-
utation. We show that lenders may want to develop a reputation for being
tough in order to attract a better class of borrowers. By doing so they can
earn higher proﬁts than lenders with a reputation for being soft. This sep-
aration suggests that over time reputational considerations may lead to the
development of hard-budget constraints. Two conditions are critical for this
outcome to occur. First, the economy must be suﬃciently transparent that
reputations can be observed. Second, the overall economy must improve so
that there are a suﬃcient level of potentially good borrowers. When both
conditions are present then tough lenders earn higher proﬁts and one may
expect that their presence in the economy will expand. This suggests that
t h e r em a yb eav i r t u o u sc i r c l ei ne c o n o m i ct r a n s i t i o n .
Given that (under certain conditions) tough lenders earn higher proﬁts
soft lenders may prefer to disguise their own reputations by engaging in
strategic liquidations to enhance their future reputations. This is ruled out
in our model because of our assumption that memory lasts only one period.
24An important topic for future research would be to add longer memories
and thus permit strategic liquidation. If soft lenders choose to pool this
may enhance the range of parameters in which the hard-budget constraint
can emerge. Without further research, however, this can only be considered
speculation. Treating reputations in a fully dynamic setting will certainly
enhance the analysis. Our model is thus only a ﬁrst step towards such an
analysis.
6 Appendix
Proposition 1. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that return on






a(X − 2) >E− e.
Then there exists a φ ≤ 1 such that for all φ ≤ φ there exist two values, L
and L(φ), 0 <L< L(φ) < 1,s u c ht h a t
• i) if L<L , then all able borrowers work hard and no project is ever
liquidated,
• ii) if L ≤ L ≤ L(φ), then all able borrowers work hard and provided
that lenders receive a low signal, all projects of borrowers with a bad
reputation are liquidated whereas all projects of borrowers with a good
reputation are reﬁnanced,
• iii) if L>L(φ), then provided that lenders receive low signal, all
projects are liquidated.
Proof: Most of the steps of this proof are carried out in the body of the
paper, so we only need to ﬁnish some details.
Provided that all borrowers work hard, the probabilities ζG|j that given
reputation j the project is good are:
ζG|F =
λΠ(1 − Π)+( 1− λ)π(1 − π)
λ(1 − Π)+( 1− λ)(1− π)
and
ζG|S =
λΠ(Π +( p + φ(1 − p))(1 − Π)) + (1 − λ)π(π +( p + φ(1 − p))(1 − π))
λ(Π +( p + φ(1 − p))(1 − Π)) + (1 − λ)(π +( p + φ(1 − p))(1 − π))
.
25One can further verify that for all φ ∈ [0,1],
π < ζG|F < ζG|S < Π.
Then, it follows immediately that the expected (conditional on observed
low signal) payoﬀ of the lender, who is matched with borrower with bad
reputation, is smaller than the payoﬀ of the lender who is matched with
borrower with good reputation:
ζG|F(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|F(x − 2) < ζG|S(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2).
Because the continuation value of the lenders is independent of their cur-
rent actions, conditional on observed low signal lenders reﬁnance all projects
if and only if:
L − 1 < ζG|F(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|F(x − 2). (20)
Then, assumption 2 guarantees that there exists L ≡ ζG|F(1 − a)(X − 2) +
ζB|F(x − 2) > 0 such that (20) holds for all L ∈ [0,L). Similarly, lenders
liquidate all projects if and only if:
ζG|S(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2) <L− 1. (21)
Assumption 1 guarantees then that there exists L(φ) ≡ ζG|S(1 − a)(X −
2) + ζB|S(x − 2) < 1 such that (21) holds for all L ∈ (L(φ),1]. Because
L < L(φ) for all φ ∈ [0,1],i fL ∈ [L,L(φ)], then lenders liquidate all projects
of borrowers with bad reputation and reﬁnance all projects of borrowers with
good reputation. The function L(φ) is decreasing in φ, which implies that
higher transparency increases the interval L ∈ [L,L(φ)], where reputation
matters.
To complete the proof we need to ﬁnd conditions, which ensure that able
borrowers work hard. The borrowers work hard if given the continuation
value (implied by lenders equilibrium strategy proﬁle) there is no beneﬁtf r o m
a unilateral defection. As we say above, it is suﬃcient that able borrowers
with bad reputation do not want to choose low eﬀort even if conditional on
low signal lenders liquidate their projects, that is:
pΠa(X−2)−E+PF|EvF +PS|EvS ≥ pπa(X−2)−e+PF|evF +PS|evS, (22)
26where the value function of able borrowers v satisﬁes the following two-





















PF|E =( 1 − φ)(1 − p)(1 − Π),
PS|E = Π + p(1 − Π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − Π)
and
PF|e =( 1 − φ)(1 − p)(1 − π),
PS|e = π + p(1 − π)+φ(1 − p)(1 − π).
O n ec a nw r i t e( 2 2 )a s :








vS ≥ E − e,
and then observe that:




=( 1− φ)(1 − p)(Π − π),
so that (22) becomes:
(Π − π)[pa(X − 2) + (1 − φ)(1 − p)(vS − vF)] ≥ E − e.
Then, subtracting the ﬁrst equation from the second equation in (23) yields:
vS − vF = β
2(1 − p)Πa(X − 2),
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a(X − 2) >E− e,
then by continuity there is some φ such that (22) holds for all φ ∈ [0,φ]. The
value of φ can be computed from (22) which then holds at equality. Notice
that if parameters satisfy
(Π − π)pa(X − 2) ≥ E − e,
27then φ =1 , i.e. the beneﬁto fh i g he ﬀo r te x c e e d si t sc o s te v e ni ft h ee c o n o m y
is fully opaque and reputation carries no information about the type of bor-
rowers. In that case able borrowers choose to work hard for all L, regardless
of whether lenders liquidate them or not. ¥
Proposition 2. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that the
return on high eﬀort is low,
(Π − π)a(X − 2) <E− e.
Then there exists a value b L such that no borrower works hard and
• i) if L<b L, then no project is ever liquidated, and
• ii) L ≥ b L, then provided that lenders receive low signal, all projects are
liquidated.
Proof: Because borrowers get zero if liquidated, the maximum payoﬀ
borrowers obtain is when no project is liquidated. The proof proceeds by
showing that given that lenders reﬁnance every borrower, condition (16) im-
p l i e st h a tr e t u r no nh i g he ﬀort is not suﬃcient to induce able borrowers work
hard.
Indeed, if lenders reﬁnance all borrowers, then able borrowers choose low
eﬀort if and only if:
Πa(X −2)−E +PF|EvF +PS|EvS < πa(X −2)−e+PF|evF +PS|evS, (24)
where the value function of able borrowers v satisﬁes the following two-




















One can rearrange (24) as:
(Π − π)[a(X − 2) + (1 − φ)(1 − p)(vS − vF)] <E− e.
It follows immediately from (25) that:
vS − vF =0 ,
28so that (24) becomes:
(Π − π)a(X − 2) <E− e.
Intuitively, because lenders reﬁnance every borrower, there is no beneﬁtf o r
the borrowers from having good reputation.
Then, provided that all borrowers choose low eﬀort, conditional on ob-
served low signal, the payoﬀ of a lender is:
π(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − π)(x − 2).
Assumption 2 guarantees then that there is a value b L,
b L ≡ π(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − π)(x − 2),
such that if L ∈ [0, b L), then lenders reﬁnance all projects and if L ∈ (b L,1],
then lenders liquidate all projects. If L = b L, then lenders are indiﬀerent,
without loss of generality one can assume that lenders liquidate, reﬁnance,
or randomize. ¥
Proposition 3. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that return
on high eﬀort is exceeds its cost,
(Π − π)pa(X − 2) >E− e.
Then, for all φ ∈ [0,1) there exists L∗, L <L ∗ < L(φ), where L and
L(φ) are deﬁned in Proposition 1, such that:
W(L;φ) <W (L;1)for all L ∈ (L,L
∗)
W(L;φ) >W (L;1)for all L ∈ (L
∗,L)
W(L;φ)=W(L;1)otherwise.
Proof: It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that conditional on
low signal lenders liquidate all borrowers if L>L(φ), liquidate all bor-
rowers with bad reputation and reﬁnance borrowers with good reputation
if L ∈ (L,L(φ)), and reﬁnance all borrowers if L<L ,w h e r eL and L(φ)
are constructed in the proof. (Notice that L is independent of φ and L(φ)
is decreasing in φ.) Provided that all able borrowers work hard (which for
29all φ ∈ [0,1] is warranted by the hypotheses of the proposition), the value
function of the borrowers is:
vAF = vAS = 1
r (pΠa(X − 2) − E)
vMF = vMS = 1
r (pΠa(X − 2) − E)



































πa(X − 2) − e
i
if L ∈ (L,L(φ)), and
vAF = vAS = 1
r (Πa(X − 2) − E)
vMF = vMS = 1
r (Πa(X − 2) − E)
if L ≤ L,w h e r er ≡ 1






v1 if L ≥ L(φ)
v2(φ) if L ∈ (L,L(φ))





(pΠa(X − 2) − E)+
1 − λ
r





1 − (1 − φ)(1 − Π)(1 − p)
2¢




1 − (1 − φ)(1 − π)(1 − p)
2¢




(Πa(X − 2) − E)+
1 − λ
r
(πa(X − 2) − e).
One can immediately see that borrowers welfare is a discontinuous non-





V1(L) if L ≥ L(φ)
V2(L;φ) if L ∈ (L,L(φ))









(p(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − p)(MF(L − 1)+
MS
¡







p(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡
MF(ζG|F(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|F(x − 2)) +
MS
¡
ζG|S(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2)
¢¢¢
,
which is continuous non-decreasing function of L. It is easy to verify that the




(p(1 − a)(X − 2) + (1 − p)((λΠ +( 1− λ)π)(1 − a)(X − 2)+
(λ(1 − Π)+( 1− λ)(1− π))(x − 2)),
which does not depend on φ. As one would expect, because outside the
interval L ∈ (L,L(φ)) reputation is irrelevant, transparency has no eﬀect on
welfare.
Now assume that φ =1 . Because in that case the measure of borrowers




v1 + V1(L) if L ≥ L(1)
v3 + V3 if L<L(1)
.
Because V (L;φ) is continuous and v(L;φ) is a step function, W(L;1) is




W(L;1),s ot h a t
w e l f a r ed e c l i n e sa sL goes above the threshold L(1).
For any φ < 1, v1 <v 2(φ) <v 3, which implies that welfare W(L;φ)
is discontinuous at both L = L and L = L(φ). Because v(L;φ) is non-
increasing, welfare W(L;φ) drops down at both points of discontinuity. This
implies that in some neighborhood L ∈ (L,L ∗), W(L;φ) <W (L;1).O n
the other hand, for any L ∈ (L(1),L(φ)),V(L;φ) >V(L;1)and v(L;φ) >
31v(L;1), which yields W(L;φ) >W (L;1). Therefore, L∗ < L(1).T h ev a l u e
of L∗ can be computed from equating W(L;φ) and W(L;1), which yields:
L
∗ − 1=ζG|F(1 − a)(X − 2) + ζB|F(x − 2)+
µA|F (Πa(X − 2) − E)+µM|F (πa(X − 2) − e).
¥
Proposition 4. Except for a set of measure zero in parameter space there
a r en oe q u i l i b r i ai nw h i c ht o u g hl e n d e r sh a v eah i g h e rp r o p e n s i t yt ol i q u i d a t e
and borrowers use matching strategy which reveals their types.
Proof: Our ﬁr s ts t e pi s ,g i v e nt h ep r o ﬁle of liquidation strategies of
lenders, to compute the probability that lender’s reputation is an accurate
indication of her type. The probability that a lender with tough reputation
is indeed tough is a ratio of a measure of tough lenders with tough reputation
to the measure of all lenders with tough reputation; the probability that a
lender with soft reputation is indeed soft is a ratio of a measure of soft lenders
with soft reputation to the measure of all lenders with soft reputation. The
measure of unmatched lenders in state (k,n), denoted ψkn, comes from the
stationary distribution Ψ implied by the transition matrix for the lenders’
reputation,
ψ ≡ (ψTU,ψTR,ψSU,ψSR).
Given the matching strategy of borrowers τ,l e tνnj be the probability
that a coalition with reputation n is matched with a pool of borrowers with
reputation j. Because reputation of a borrower is independent of lenders’
actions, νnj depends only on τ and on the measures Mij of borrowers in all
four states (i,j); provided that all able borrowers work hard, Mij is given
by (3). Let us deﬁne a function In(i,j), which given τ maps borrower’s state










0 if (i,j) / ∈ τ−1(n)
1
2 if (i,j) ∈ τ−1(U) ∩ τ−1(R)
1 otherwise
.
The function In(i,j) summarizes borrower’s matching strategy from the
viewpoint of a lender. A coalition has no chance to meet those who tar-
get other lenders; a coalition meets those who target both groups of lenders
32with probability one half; a coalition meets all of those who target lenders
with a given reputation. Then, our assumption that every coalition has a












Recall that fknjσ is the strategy of a matched coalition – the probability
that given an after-the-ﬁrst-stage-of-a-project state z ≡ (k,n,j,σ) a coali-
tion reﬁnances the project. Because lenders cannot change their type, the





















νnj (pfknjσ +( 1− p)fknjσ).
The matrix Tk shows the transition of reputation of a coalition of lenders of
type k; ﬁrst, it is who this coalition meets, then it is what signal the coalition
observes, and then it is what the coalition does in terms of liquidation.
The associated stationary distribution ψ is a solution to ψT = ψ and to




























33(Notice that if equilibrium proﬁle of strategies implies ωkRU+ωkUR =0 ,t h e n
every distribution ψk ≡ (ψkU ψkR) is a stationary distribution.) Given that
distribution, the measure of lenders with tough reputation is ψU ≡ ψTU +
ψSU and the measure of lenders with a soft reputation is ψR ≡ ψTR+ ψSR.











Because tough lenders have a higher propensity to liquidate:
fTnjσ ≤ fSnjσ, (30)
for all n, j,a n dσ, and there is a pair of states z1 ≡ (T,n,j,σ) and z2 ≡
(S,n,j,σ) such that νnj > 0 and the inequality in (30) is strict.19 The latter
implies that:
ωTRU ≥ ωSRU and ωSUR ≥ ωTUR, (31)
where at least one inequality is strict. The inequality (31) implies:
µT|U > κ and µS|R > 1 − κ. (32)
As one would expect, because tough lenders have a higher propensity to
liquidate, the probability that given tough (soft) reputation, a lender is tough
(soft) is greater than the objective prior probability that a randomly drawn
lender is tough (soft), so that lenders’ reputation is informative of their types.
Given the matching strategy τ and the eﬀort-choice proﬁle of strategies
of able borrowers dA,l e tvij be the value of an unmatched borrower in state




RMjπ(X − 2) − e + PS|evMS + PF|evMF
¤
, (33)
19Notice that n ∈ τ(i,j) in the deﬁnition of higher propensity to liquidate and Mij > 0
imply that νnj > 0.
34vAj = β
2 [RAj (dAjnΠ +( 1− dAjn)π)(X − 2) − (dAjnE +( 1− dAjn)e)+ (34)
¡










Rij = µT|n(pfTnjσ +( 1− p)fTnjσ)aT + µS|n(pfSnjσ +( 1− p)fSnjσ)aS (35)
is the expected return of a borrower in state (i,j) and n ∈ τ(i,j). (Notice
that if borrowers use type-dependent matching strategy τ, then borrowers
with the same reputation may obtain diﬀerent returns Rij.)
The ﬁnal step of the proof is to argue that because types and histories
are unobservable, borrowers either use type-independent matching strategy
τ (provided that either RMj >R Aj or RAj >R Mj) or provided that RAj =
RMj, the latter implies a binding restriction on model parameters.
Assume now that borrowers use type-dependent matching strategy, i.e.
that there is a j such that τ(A,j) 6= τ(M,j). Let us assume that RMj >R Aj,
and consider a unilateral defection by an able borrower who has reputa-
tion j (here we mean that instead of targeting lenders with reputation n,
n ∈ τ(A,j), the borrower unilaterally decides to target lenders with repu-
tation n0, n0 ∈ τ(M,j)). Because defections by groups of measure zero do
not aﬀect stationary distribution ψ and because lenders cannot observe the
types of borrowers, such a defection yields one-period return RMj to the de-
fector. Then, because the probability of a successful letter is independent
of lender’s actions (i.e. decisions to liquidate/reﬁnance in a given state z)
and because letters carry no information about lender’s state (the matching
history is unobservable), defection has no eﬀect on the continuation value
of the defector who can still (by following τ and eﬀort-choice strategies dA)
secure the continuation value (the second line in 34) in all future periods.
Thus, defection yields a higher value to the defector. By a similar argument,
if τ is such that for some j, RAj >R Mj, mediocre borrowers will choose
to defect. Thus, either borrowers type-independent matching strategy τ or
RMj = RAj.
The latter implies:
µT|U(pfTUjσ +( 1− p)fTUjσ)aT + µS|U(pfSUjσ +( 1− p)fSUjσ)aS = (36)
µT|R(pfTRjσ +( 1− p)fTRjσ)aT + µS|R(pfSRjσ +( 1− p)fSRjσ)aS.
As is shown in proof of Proposition 5, because lenders fully discount the
future, i.e. δ =0 , their equilibrium liquidation/reﬁnancing decisions are
35independent of their reputation, i.e. fkRjσ = fkLjσ for all k, j,a n dσ.T h a t
means that the two expressions in brackets in the ﬁr s tl i n eo f( 3 6 )a r ee q u a lt o
corresponding expressions in the second line of that same equation. Because
µT|U > κ and µS|R > 1 − κ, µT|U > κ >µ T|R and µS|R > 1 − κ >µ S|U.T h e
latter implies that equation (36) yields a binding restriction on the model
parameters.20 ¥
Corollary. Except for sets of measure zero in parameter space there are
no equilibria in which tough lenders have a higher propensity to liquidate,
lenders’ reputation is essential, and borrowers’ reputation is not essential.
Proof: Inessentiality of borrowers’ reputation means that for all types k,
reputations n, and signals σ,
fknj1σ = fknj2σ,
which implies that Rij1 = Rij2. By the argument in proof of proposition 3,
if either RMj1 = RMj2 >R Aj1 = RAj2 or RAj1 = RAj2 >R Mj1 = RMj2,
all borrowers choose to meet lenders with the same reputation and abandon
lenders with other reputation, which contradicts the range of τ being in the
set {U,R}.I f RMS = RAS = RMF = RAF, then (36) implies a binding
restriction on the model parameters. ¥
Proposition 5. Assume that Assumption 1 holds with respect to a = aT,
Π(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − Π)(x − 2) < 0,
Assumption 2 holds with respect to a = aS,
−1 < π(1 − aS)(X − 2) + (1 − π)(x − 2),
paT <a S,
20Notice that the null proﬁle cannot be an equilibrium because this means that lenders
liquidate all projects and, hence, incur losses from all projects. This yields lenders a
negative value, which is worse than giving no funds to borrowers – an option always
feasible for the lenders.









2(1 − φ)(1 − p)Π
Ã







(X − 2) ≥ E−e,
and liquidation values LS and LT satisfy:
LS <L S,
LT <L T < LT
where LS, LT, and LT are constructed in proof. Then:
• i) borrowers with good reputation meet lenders with tough reputation;
borrowers with bad reputation meet lenders with soft reputation,
• ii) all able borrowers work hard,
• iii) soft lenders reﬁnance all projects and, conditional on observed low
signal, tough lenders liquidate all projects of borrowers with bad repu-
tation.
Proof: We want to construct an equilibrium in which good borrowers meet
lenders with tough reputation, bad borrowers meet lenders with soft repu-
tation, tough lenders liquidate bad borrowers with low signal and reﬁnance
all other borrowers, and soft lenders reﬁnance all borrowers. The proﬁle f of
lenders’ reﬁnancing strategies, which corresponds to that situation is:
fTUFσ = fTRFσ =0and fknjσ =1f o ra l lo t h e rs t a t e sz.





















and ψSR =1− κ. (38)
The probability that given tough reputation a lender is tough, µT|U,c a nb e
computed using (28) and (37),
µT|U =1 ,
the probability that given soft reputation a lender is soft, µS|R,c a nb ec o m -




2−p +( 1− κ)
.
Notice that µT|U > κ and µS|R > 1 − κ.
Given the proﬁle f of lenders’ strategies, the return of borrowers with
good reputation who meet lenders with tough reputation is
RiS = aT; (39)
the return of borrowers with good reputation who meet lenders with soft
reputation is
RiS =( 1− µS|R)aT + µS|RaS. (40)
Because aT >a S and 1 > κ > 1 − µS|R, borrowers with good reputation
will choose to meet with lenders who have tough reputation. The return of
borrowers with bad reputation who meet lenders with tough reputation is
RiF = paT; (41)
the return of borrowers with bad reputation who meet lenders with soft
reputation is
RiF =( 1− µS|R)paT + µS|RaS =
κpaT +( 1− κ)(2− p)aS
κ +( 1− κ)(2− p)
. (42)
Because aS >p a T and µS|R > 1−κ > 0, borrowers with bad reputation will
choose to meet with lenders who have soft reputation. Notice here that
RiS = aT >a S >R iF










ΠRAF(X − 2) − E + PS|EvAS + PF|EvAF
¢
,
where RAS and RAF are given by (39) and (42) respectively. All able bor-
rowers work hard if a unilateral defection by an able borrower with bad





κpaT +( 1− κ)(2− p)aS
κ +( 1− κ)(2− p)
+
β
2(1 − φ)(1 − p)Π((2 − p − κ)(aT − aS)+κ(1 − p)aS)
κ +( 1− κ)(2− p)
¸
(X − 2) ≥ E−e.
Given borrowers’ matching strategy τ, each member of a coalition with a























Because lenders fully discount the future, they compare one-period gains
from reﬁnancing and liquidation of borrowers. Conditional on an observed
low signal, the payoﬀ from reﬁnancing is:
Λn
¡
ζG|j(1 − ak)(X − 2) + ζB|j(x − 2)
¢
,
39and the payoﬀ from liquidation is:
Λn (Lk − 1).
One can see that proﬁle f of lenders strategies is an equilibrium proﬁle if
and only if:
ζG|F(1−aT)(X−2)+ζB|F(x−2) ≤ LT −1 ≤ ζG|S(1−aT)(X−2)+ζB|S(x−2)
(43)
LS − 1 ≤ ζG|F(1 − aS)(X − 2) + ζB|F(x − 2) (44)
where the probability that given reputation j of a borrower her project is
good, ζG|j, and the probability that her project is bad, ζB|j,a r eg i v e nb y
(3) and (5)-(8). Because ζG|j and ζB|j are independent of liquidation costs
Lk, expressions (43)-(44) pin down the cutoﬀ values LS, LT and LT right
away. Assumption 1 guarantees that LT < 1; assumption 2 guarantees that
LS > 0.N o t i c et h a ta sφ → 1,b o t hζG|S and ζG|F approach λ, the objective
probability that a randomly drawn borrower is able. In that case LT → LT,
which implies that if economy is opaque, then the region in parameter space
consistent with the above equilibrium is small. ¥
Proposition 6. Assume that hypotheses of Proposition 5 hold except that
condition (17) on able borrowers eﬀort is replaced by:
(Π − π)
£
κpaT +( 1− κ)aS + β
2 (1 − φ)(1− p)
2 κaTΠ
¤
(X − 2) ≥ E − e.
(45)
Then, bringing in lenders reputation increases welfare of both types of bor-
rowers. Moreover, if parameters satisfy:




then lenders reputation increases proﬁts of tough lenders and decreases proﬁts
of soft lenders.
Proof: Because lenders fully discount the future, given hypotheses of the
proposition they use identical liquidation strategies, fTUFσ = fTRFσ =0
and fknjσ =1for all other states, regardless of whether their reputation is
available or not. Assume that lenders reputation is unavailable. Given that
40in this case borrowers randomize among lenders, Bellman equations of able
borrowers (provided that they work hard) are the following:
vAS = β
2 ¡




rFΠ(X − 2) − E + PS|EvAS + PF|EvAF
¢ , (47)
where
rS = κaT +( 1− κ)aS, (48)
rF = κpaT +( 1− κ)aS, (49)
the probability of success PS|E and the probability of failure PF|E conditional
on high eﬀort are given by (12). Notice that one-period returns in (48)-(49)
are diﬀerent from those in Proposition 3 because lenders are now hetero-
geneous with respect to liquidation costs. The welfare of able borrowers is
then:
wA = MASvAS + MAFvAF,
where the measure of able borrowers with good reputation MAS and the






2 [MAS (rSΠ(X − 2) − E)+MAF (rFΠ(X − 2) − E)].
Likewise, Bellman equations of mediocre borrowers are:
vMS = β
2 ¡




rFπ(X − 2) − e + PS|evMS + PF|evMF
¢ , (50)
where probability of success PS|e and the probability of failure PF|e condi-
tional on low eﬀort are given by (13). The welfare of mediocre borrowers
is:
wM = MMSvMS + MMFvMF,
where the measure of able borrowers with good reputation MAS and the
measure of able borrowers with bad reputation MAF are given by (3). One
can verify that:




2 [MMS(rSπ(X − 2) − e)+MMF (rFπ(X − 2) − e)].
The total welfare of borrowers is then w = wA + wM.
41The condition that when borrowers randomize all able borrowers work
hard is:
rFΠ(X −2)−E +PS|EvAS +PF|EvAF ≥ rFπ(X −2)−e+PS|evAS +PF|evAF,
which can be simpliﬁed to:
(Π − π)
£
κpaT +( 1− κ)aS + β
2 (1 − φ)(1− p)
2 κaTΠ
¤
(X − 2) ≥ E − e.
Assume now that lenders reputation is available, so that borrowers use
matching strategy described in Proposition 5. Then, the Bellman equations
of both able and mediocre borrowers are identical to those in (47) and (50)















2 [MAS (RSΠ(X − 2) − E)+MAF (RFΠ(X − 2) − E)].
and welfare of mediocre borrowers is:




2 [MMS(RSπ(X − 2) − e)+MMF (RFπ(X − 2) − e)].
Because RS >r S and RF >r F for all κ ∈ (0,1), WA >w A and WM >w M,
so that lenders reputation increases welfare of all borrowers.
The condition that all able borrowers work hard in that case is given by
(17) in Proposition 5. One can verify that it is implied by (45), which is not
surprising given that lenders reputation increases borrowers payoﬀs.
Let us now look at lenders proﬁts. Assume ﬁrst that lenders reputation




p(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡
(LT − 1)MF +
¡





42and proﬁts of soft lenders are:
(1 − κ)[p(1−aS)(X−2)+(1−p)(
¡




ζG|S(1 − aS)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2)
¢
MS)],
where the probability that given reputation j of a borrower her project is
good, ζG|j, and the probability that her project is bad, ζB|j,a r eg i v e nb y( 3 )
and (5)-(8).
Assume now that lenders reputation is available. Then, given borrowers
matching strategy, proﬁts of tough lenders are:
ψTR[p(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − p)(LT − 1)]ΛR+
ψTU
£
p(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡




µT|R [p(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − p)(LT − 1)]MF+
µT|U
£
p(1 − aT)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡
ζG|S(1 − aT)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2)
¢¤
MS,
where the measure of lenders of type k with reputation n, ψkn,a n dt h e
number of borrowers per lender with reputation n, Λn,a r ed e ﬁn e di np r o o f
of Proposition 5. Recall that the probability that given soft reputation a





2−p +( 1− κ)
< κ,
and the probability that given tough reputation a lender is tough is:
µT|U =1> κ.
Then, condition (46) implies that:
MF ≡ (1 − φ)(1 − p)(λ(1 − Π)+( 1− λ)(1− π)) < MS.
Because given the equilibrium proﬁle of lenders strategies, individual ratio-
nality implies that:
LT − 1 < ζG|S(1 − aT)(X − 2) + ζB|S(x − 2),
one obtains that lenders reputation increases proﬁts of tough lenders.
43Likewise, proﬁts of soft lenders are:
µS|R
£
p(1 − aS)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡





p(1 − aS)(X − 2) + (1 − p)
¡







2−p +( 1− κ)
> 1 − κ, (51)
and
µS|L =0< 1 − κ.
Then, because given observed low signal the probability that borrower with
bad reputation has good project is smaller than the probability that borrower
with good reputation has good project:
ζG|F < ζG|S,
one can see that bringing in lenders reputation decreases proﬁts of soft
lenders. ¥
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